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A Multi-Tier Wireless Spectrum Sharing System
Leveraging Secure Spectrum Auctions
Ahmed Abdelhadi, Haya Shajaiah, and Charles Clancy,
Abstract—Secure spectrum auctions can revolutionize the
spectrum utilization of cellular networks and satisfy the ever
increasing demand for resources. In this paper, a multi-tier
dynamic spectrum sharing system is studied for efficient sharing
of spectrum with commercial wireless system providers (WSPs),
with an emphasis on federal spectrum sharing. The proposed
spectrum sharing system optimizes usage of spectrum resources,
manages intra-WSP and inter-WSP interference and provides
essential level of security, privacy, and obfuscation to enable
the most efficient and reliable usage of the shared spectrum.
It features an intermediate spectrum auctioneer responsible for
allocating resources to commercial WSPs by running secure spec-
trum auctions. The proposed secure spectrum auction, MTSSA,
leverages Paillier cryptosystem to avoid possible fraud and bid-
rigging. Numerical simulations are provided to compare the
performance of MTSSA, in the considered spectrum sharing
system, with other spectrum auction mechanisms for realistic
cellular systems.
Index Terms—Multi-Tier Secure Spectrum Auction, Paillier
Cryptosystem, Bid-rigging, Fraud
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, radio spectrum management is controlled by
a central government agency such as the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) in the United States. Such a cen-
tralized spectrum assignment mechanism predetermines static
bands for specific usage without taking into consideration the
service requirements and the dynamic nature of the radio spec-
trum. This results in an under-utilized pre-assigned spectrum
bands while many of the commercial bands are overcrowded
due to the rapid growth of wireless services. To address this
limitation in the spectrum utilization, the FCC has legalized
secondary markets for spectrum such that a primary spectrum
licensee can lease its under-utilized spectrum to secondary
incumbents [1]. Inspired by microeconomics mechanisms [2]–
[4], spectrum auction seems to be a promising solution to
release the under-utilized spectrum to potential secondary
users [5]–[7]. There has been some previous work to deal with
security issues in auction design. These works have focused
on adding some new features to the auction design, such as
confidentiality, fairness [8], [9] and anonymity.
Because of the reusability feature of the radio spectrum,
traditional auctions can not be directly used in a spectrum
auction design. Spectrum auctions should allow bidders, that
are not within the interference radius of each other, to use the
same frequency simultaneously. Therefore, the optimal spec-
trum allocation is considered NP-complete [10], [11] whereas
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conventional auctions are based on optimal allocations [5].
In addition, a spectrum auction design is challenged by the
effect of the back-room dealing, between insincere bidders
and the auctioneer, to the whole network. A secure spectrum
auction needs to avoid possible frauds of the auctioneer and
bid-rigging between the bidders and the auctioneer.
In this paper, we design a secure spectrum auction that
leverages Paillier cryptosystem, MTSSA, to avoid possible
frauds and bid-riggings and provide a framework for a multi-
tier spectrum sharing system to achieve an efficient utilization
for the under-utilized spectrum.
A. Related Work
Most early works in spectrum auctions, such as [5], [7],
have focused on single-seller multi-buyer auctions that deal
with homogeneous channels. In [5], the authors have proposed
VERITAS, a truthful mechanism that supports an eBay-like
dynamic spectrum market. It is a good fit for short term and
small regions based spectrum auction which is not the case
in FCC required spectrum auction which is for long term and
large geographical regions. To deal with interference between
neighboring bidders, a conflict graph and a wireless spectrum
auction framework have been proposed in [5]. Based on these
concepts, a conflict graph is used to represent the interference
relationship in VERITAS [5]. In a sealed secondary price and
VCG auctions, the dominant strategy for certain bidder, when
he has no information about other bidders’ bids, is to bid
with his true evaluation values [12]. The authors in [13] have
showed that it is not always right to allocate spectrum bands to
the bidder with the highest bid, as proposed in [5], if the sum
of the neighbors bids is much higher than the highest bid. Their
proposed solution is based on grouping nodes such that nodes
with no interference are grouped together. However, their
group partition approach is NP-complete under interference
constraints [11].
The authors in [6] have proposed TRUST, a spectrum
trading approach that satisfies some good properties. However,
it achieves truthfulness while sacrificing one group of bidders,
as it takes the group’s bid as the clearing price. In [14], the
authors have improved the idea of TRUST as they succeeded
to achieve truthfulness by only sacrificing one buyer in each
group. But, both works [6], [14] have inherited McAfee
mechanism [15] which requires homogeneous channels. In
[16], the proposed TASC mechanism was the first to consider
heterogeneous channels. However, it can reduce the system
efficiency as all channels are restricted to a unique clearing
price. In [17], [18], TASC mechanism has been extended
to consider spectrum reusability and diversity of channel
characteristics. In [19], the authors have proposed a privacy
preserving auction for spectrum trading. In [20], [21], an
auction based framework is purposed. A third party leases
its unused resources to service providers to provide dynamic
cellular offloading.
In [5], [18], the authors have exploited frequency interfer-
ence property. They used interference graph model that makes
spectrum allocation, allows spectrum reuse and avoids inter-
ference. In [6], [14], the authors have utilized the reusability
property by dividing buyers into groups such that buyers in
the same group do not interfere with each other. Each group
of buyers either wins or loses the same channel.
Most of existing works have failed to consider spectrum
bands as non identical bands. Spectrum reusability in an
auction design has been first addressed in [6]. In [22], the
authors have modeled a spectrum auction based on spectrum
reusability in a time-frequency division manner. The authors in
[23] have also considered spectrum reusability in their auction
design by assuming that each spectrum buyer is allowed to
have multiple radios. The proposed MTSSA scheme also sup-
ports the frequency reusability property. Moreover, MTSSA
supports the case of heterogeneous frequency bands.
Beside the properties of secondary price auctions that are
beneficial to have in a spectrum auction, i.e. such as in-
centive compatibility, individual rationality and no positive
transfers, it is important to secure the spectrum auction to
avoid potential back room dealing. An ideal spectrum auction
design would allow the auctioneer to find the best allocation
of the frequency bands, determine the winners and their
payments while the bidders keep their actual bidding values
secret and unknown to the auctioneer. This can prevent frauds
made by insincere auctioneers and bid rigging between the
auctioneer and the bidders. There has been some previous
works in secure spectrum auctions. The authors in [24]–
[26], have used homomorphic encryption to secure traditional
auction designs. In [27], the authors have considered frequency
reuse in their secure spectrum auction design, and propose
THEMIS. However, THEMIS does not support multi-tier
spectrum sharing systems where spectrum reuse is possible
among multiple service providers. In these systems a dynamic
spectrum sharing approach is required to provide an efficient
sharing of the spectrum among multiple service providers.
In this paper we design a truthful secure spectrum auction
framework by considering the spectrum spatial reuse property
and the heterogeneous propagation properties of different
frequency bands. We propose MTSSA, a secure spectrum auc-
tion design that provides framework for a multi-tier dynamic
spectrum sharing system and optimizes allocating the spectrum
resources that are managed by a broker (i.e. the auctioneer). It
allows the auctioneer to allocate its under-utilized frequency
bands, leased from federal government, to commercial WSPs
by running secure spectrum auction. By leveraging Paillier
cryptosystem, MTSSA can prevent possible frauds and bid-
rigging.
B. Our Contributions
The major contributions of the proposed spectrum auction
are summarized as:
• MTSSA considers spectrum reusability and the case
of heterogeneous frequency bands, e.g. commercial and
federal bands.
• MTSSA provides a framework for a multi-tier dynamic
spectrum sharing system that allows an efficient spectrum
sharing of the under-utilized spectrum with commercial
WSPs. The auctioneer allocates the under-utilized fre-
quency bands to commercial WSPs’ BSs by running a
secure spectrum auction. MTSSA optimizes the usage of
spectrum resources by managing intra-WSP and inter-
WSP interference. In order to account for frequency
reusability, the auctioneer divides the network into sub-
nets and auctions the frequency bands in each of the
subnets one after another. Each bidder (i.e. BS), maintains
a conflict-table. The bidder updates the conflict-table and
share his spectrum occupancy status with his neighbors
when changes are made.
• MTSSA provides a truthful auction that is achieved when
each bidder submits its true evaluation value. Truthful-
ness is a dominant strategy for MTSSA as it prevents
manipulating the auction.
• MTSSA uses a payment method that satisfies some essen-
tial economic properties such as incentive compatibility,
individual rationality and no positive transfers.
• MTSSA leverages Paillier cryptosystem [27]–[29] to
create a ciphertext for the bidding values. Each BS
submits its bidding values through a buffer that creates an
encrypted version of the bidding values. While the actual
bidding values are kept secret from the auctioneer, the
auctioneer is still able to reveal the auction results and
charge the bidders securely.
• MTSSA provides a secure spectrum auction that prevents
frauds of insincere auctioneers and bid-rigging while
achieving an efficient spectrum utilization, revenue and
bidders’ satisfaction.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the spectrum trading architecture is described
and the system model for the Multi-Tier spectrum sharing
secure auction MTSSA is outlined. In Section III, design
considerations are presented. We describe the payment method
for the proposed auction in Section III-A, prove its satisfaction
of some desired economic properties in Section III-B and
describe the design challenges in III-C. In Section IV, we
present the frequency bands allocation procedure and the
encryption design using Paillier cryptosystem for the proposed
MTSSA. Simulation set up and performance analysis are
discussed in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Spectrum Trading Architecture
We consider a spectrum trading scenario where the spectrum
owner is a federal regulatory agency that leases its under-
utilized spectrum on a long-term basis to a broker which
manages spectrum assets and plays the role of a middleman
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for the spectrum owner of the under-utilized spectrum, e.g.
federal government, and the WSPs. The architecture of this
spectrum assignments is represented through a spectrum pyra-
mid as shown in Figure 1. At the top of this pyramid, is
the spectrum owner that leases the under-utilized frequency
bands to a spectrum broker under certain rules [1], [30], [31].
The broker represents a secondary market place that auctions
these frequency bands to WSPs. At the bottom of the pyramid,
are the end users devices (i.e. users equipments (UEs)) that
are assigned spectrum by the WSPs base stations (BSs). In
this paper we focus on designing a secure spectrum auction
between the broker (i.e. the auctioneer) and the WSPs base
stations to allocate the under-utilized frequency bands.
Fig. 1. A spectrum pyramid that represents an architecture for the under-
utilized spectrum assignments.
B. Spectrum Auction Model
Consider a spectrum auction setting, where one auctioneer
(i.e. the broker in Figure 1) auctions a set of frequency bands
M = {1, 2, ...,M} to N = {1, 2, ..., N} bidders (i.e. nodes
representing BSs) located in the same geographical region
where N represents a set of all bidders that belong to different
WSPs. Let L be the number of WSPs where each WSP has a
coverage area within the auction’s geographical region. Each
WSP (i.e. the lth WSP) provides a mobile wireless service
over multiple cellular cells. Its cellular network consists of
macro cells and small cells. Within the coverage area of
some macro cells, there exist one or more small cells with
pico/femto BSs, see Figure 2. Let N l be the set of all of
macro cells and small cells BSs that belong to the lth WSP
and let N be a set of all nodes that belong to the L WSPs
where N = N 1 ∪ N 2 ∪ ... ∪ NL and N = |N |.
In this paper, we consider a multi-band spectrum auction
where each node can bid for a single or multiple frequency
bands from the set of available frequency bands M based
on its demand. Once the broker leases the spectrum owner’s
unused frequency bands in M for a time duration T , the
broker becomes the owner of the spectrum bands in M.
Meanwhile, the interested WSPs submit their bids to the
broker. Let the allocation set K = {α1, α2, ...} denotes the
set of all possible allocations of the frequency bands M.
For example, given that M = {1, 2} and N = {1, 2},
we have K = {α1 = ({1, 2}, {}), α2 = ({1}, {2}), α3 =
({2}, {1}), α4 = ({}, {1, 2})}, where (α1 = ({1, 2}, {})
denotes that frequency bands 1 and 2 are allocated to bidder
1 and nothing to bidder 2. Each node submits its sealed bids
bn = [bn(α
1), bn(α
2), ...], e.g. b1 = [2, 1, 1, 0] indicates that
node 1 bids 2 for allocation α1, 1 for allocation α2, 1 for
allocation α3 and 0 for allocation α4. For certain allocation
α = αn, each node n has a true evaluation value vn(α). Let
vn = [vn(α
1), vn(α
2), ...] be the true evaluation vector for
node n. Let pn represents the price that is charged by the
auctioneer to bidder n for allocating the frequency bands.
The utility of bidder n, denoted by Un, is defined as the
difference between the bidder’s true evaluation value and the
actual price it pays to the auctioneer pi, Un = vn(α) − pn,
for a specific allocation α. The Auctioneer’s revenue from the
spectrum sales is defined as R =
∑n=N
n=1 pn. We assume that
bidders can submit different bids for different combinations of
the frequency bands. Table I summarizes some of the notations
used in the design.
TABLE I
KEY SYMBOLS IN THIS PAPER
M Frequency bands set
N l Bidders set for all bidders that belong to WSP l
N Bidders set of all nodes that belong to the L WSPs, N =
N 1 ∪ N 2 ∪ ... ∪ NL
K Allocation set K = {α1, α2, ..., αi}
bn Node n sealed bids vector for the allocation set K
vn True evaluation vector of BS n
pn Price charged by the auctioneer to BS n
Un Bidder’s utility, Un = vn(α) − pn
R Auctioneer’s revenue, R =
∑
n=N
n=1
pn
In Figure 2, we show two WSPs (i.e. L = 2) providing
service in the same geographical region where the broker
performs its spectrum auction. Both WSPs are interested in
the auctioneer’s frequency bands M. Therefore, both of them
participate in the spectrum auction. In the coverage area of
each WSP there exists multiple macro cells and small cells
managed by that WSP. BSs requesting additional frequency
bands submit sealed bidding vectors to the auctioneer via
an intermediate secure gateway to participate in the auction
of the under-utilized federal spectrum bands. Considering
the frequency reuse property [6], [11], each BS has certain
coverage radius (i.e. assume it is equivalent to the cell’s
radius). Within the coverage radius of the nth BS, non of the
interfering BSs can simultaneously use any of the frequency
bands that the nth BS is using. However, a non-interfering BS
can use the same frequency band that is simultaneously used
by a BS located outside its coverage radius without causing
interference, i.e. frequency reuse is utilized in our model.
The auctioneer constructs an interference conflict graph for
all the BSs that are participating in the auction. In Figure 3,
we show the frequency conflict graph with all bidders/BSs
that belong to the two WSPs, each BS is connected with
other BSs located within its coverage radius (i.e. bidder n
is connected with all BSs that must not simultaneously use
same frequency bands due to interference between them)
where the edges represent mutual interference between the
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Fig. 2. Two WSPs with a coverage area within the geographical region
where the auction takes place. In each WSP’s macro cells and small cells, all
the BSs that are interested in the auctioneer’s under-utilized frequency bands
are part of the interference conflict graph.
Fig. 3. Frequency conflict graph for all BSs that belong to the two WSPs
shown in Figure 2. Each node represents one BS and the edges represent
mutual interference between the end points (i.e. BSs). Subnet 1 consists of
the small cell’s BS (i.e. BS 1), which represents the root BS for the subnet,
and the macro cell’s BS (i.e. BS 2). Subnet 2 consists of BSs 2, 3, 4 and 5
where BS 2 is the root BS.
corresponding BSs. The interference conflict graph can be
constructed using physical or protocol channel model [32].
It is assumed that there exists a pilot channel, like the one in
[33], to exchange information between the auctioneer and the
BSs or simply by sending that unsecured information with the
bids. Furthermore, the proposed spectrum auction is executed
in one subnet after another where a subnet is defined to be
a group of BSs that includes one root BS, i.e. BS n, and all
other BSs that are connected to it through interference edges
(i.e. the BSs that have mutual interference with BS n) but not
previously considered root BSs. Figure 3 shows two subnets in
the frequency conflict graph of the two WSPs. In Figure 4, we
show the spectrum auction model for MTSSA for two WSPs’
participate in the spectrum auction. First, all BSs submit their
encrypted bidding vectors via an intermediate gateway that is
operated by federal government. The auctioneer then carries
out a secure spectrum auction in one subnet after another. It
then allocates the winning BSs frequency bands and charges
them for the allocated resources.
Fig. 4. Spectrum auction model for the proposed MTSSA with two WSPs’
BSs participating in the auction.
III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we present the payment method for the
proposed auction. We also discuss some economic properties
that need to be considered in the design and prove that by
using a VCG based auction approach some desired economic
properties can be satisfied.
A. The Payment Method
Our goal is to use a payment rule that satisfies some of the
required economic properties, such as incentive compatibility,
individual rationality and no positive transfers. In addition, it
is important for the payment rule to provide a satisfactory
revenue for the auctioneer. Under certain assumptions, it has
been proven that VCG auction satisfies these three economic
properties while maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue [34].
VCG auction is also proven to be Pareto efficient [35]. In
VCG, each bidder submits its true evaluation values regardless
of the bidding values that other bidders submit. This is a
dominant strategy for the bidder to maximize its utility and
win the auction. In our design, we use a payment method
that is based on VCG mechanism with Clarke pivot payments
[36]. Using this payment rule, each bidder pays the difference
between the social welfare with and without his participation
(i.e. bidder n pays the externality he causes). Consider the
same system setup as described in Section II. Each bidder n
submits its sealed bidding vector bn for the allocation set K.
The auctioneer selects a Pareto efficient allocation α∗ ∈ K
where α∗ is defined as
α∗ = argmax
α∈K
∑
n
bn(α). (1)
With truthful bidding values, the auctioneer assigns its fre-
quency bands M based on α∗ allocation. Furthermore, let
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α∗−n ∈ K be an allocation without node n participating that
is defined as
α∗−n = argmax
α∈K
∑
k 6=n
bk(α). (2)
The auctioneer charges bidder n a payment pn that is equiv-
alent to
pn =
∑
k 6=n
bk(α
∗
−n)−
∑
k 6=n
bk(α
∗). (3)
Then, the utility of bidder n can be expressed as
Un = vn(α
∗)− pn
= vn(α
∗)− (
∑
k 6=n
bk(α
∗
−n)−
∑
k 6=n
bk(α
∗))
= [vn(α
∗) +
∑
k 6=n
bk(α
∗)]−
∑
k 6=n
bk(α
∗
−n).
(4)
B. Desired Economic Auction Properties
It is essential for an auction to have certain economic
properties. First, we discuss these economic properties and
then we prove that by using a VCG based auction approach
these properties can be satisfied.
1) Incentive Compatibility (truthfulness): An auction is in-
centive compatible if non of the bidders can get higher
utility by not reporting its true evaluation vector. Based
on this property, a dominant strategy for any bidder is to
declare its true evaluation value regardless of what the
other bidders do.
2) Individual Rationality: An auction is individually rational
if the utility Un for each bidder n is greater or equal
zero (i.e. Un ≥ 0). Meaning that the winning bidders
obtain non-negative utility (i.e. bidders do not pay more
than their evaluation values) from the auction and no one
suffer as a result of participating in the auction.
3) No Positive Transfers: In auctions with no positive trans-
fers, the payment of any bidder n must be greater or
equal zero (i.e. pn ≥ 0). This prevents situations when
the auctioneer has to pay the bidders.
In Lemma III.1, Lemma III.2 and Lemma III.3, we show
that by using the payment method and the VCG based auction
approach discussed above, the aforementioned desired eco-
nomic properties can be satisfied.
Lemma III.1. Let vn and v
′
n
6= vn be the nth bidder bidding
vector when it is equivalent to its true evaluation values and
any other values, respectively, and let α∗ and α∗
′
be the
allocations that maximize the social welfare when vn and v′n
are declared, respectively. Then, for the nth bidder, the utility
Un ≥ U
′
n.
Proof: Using the utility definition and payment method
in Section III-A, the utility of bidder n is Un = vn(α∗) +∑
k 6=n vk(α
∗) −
∑
k 6=n vk(α
∗
−n) when declaring vn whereas
the utility of bidder n is U ′n = vn(α∗
′
) +
∑
k 6=n vk(α
∗
′
) −∑
k 6=n vk(α
∗
−n) when declaring v
′
n. Since α∗ is the allocation
that maximizes the social welfare, we have the following
inequality: ∑
n
vn(α
∗) ≥
∑
n
vn(α
∗
′
). (5)
Now, by subtracting the term
∑
k 6=n vk(α
∗
−n) from both sides
of equation (5), we get Un ≥ U ′n which is the incentive
compatibility property.
Lemma III.2. Let α∗ and α∗−n be the allocations that
maximize the social welfare with and without node n’s par-
ticipation, respectively, with the assumption that each bidder
submits its true evaluation values. Then each bidder n do
not suffer as a result of participating in the auction and the
auction’s winners do not pay more than their evaluation values
(i.e. Un ≥ 0).
Proof: To show individual rationality, consider the utility
of node n:
Un = vn(α
∗) +
∑
k 6=n
vk(α
∗)−
∑
k 6=n
vk(α
∗
−n)
≥
∑
j
vj(α
∗)−
∑
j
vj(α
∗
−n)
≥ 0.
The first inequality holds since vn(α∗) +
∑
k 6=n vk(α
∗) =∑
j vj(α
∗),
∑
j vj(α
∗
−n) ≥
∑
k 6=n vk(α
∗
−n) and∑
j vj(α
∗
−n) ≥ 0. The second inequality holds because
α∗ is the allocation that maximizes the social welfare,∑
j vj(α
∗).
Lemma III.3. As a result of using the payment method in
Section III-A, the auction has no positive transfers (i.e. pn ≥ 0
for each bidder n).
Proof: From equation (3), we have pn =∑
k 6=n bk(α
∗
−n) −
∑
k 6=n bk(α
∗) ≥ 0, since α∗−n is the
allocation that maximizes the social welfare without the nth
bidder participation,
∑
k 6=n bk(α
∗
−n).
C. Design Challenges
Truthfullness is one of the important properties that needs
to be taking into consideration when designing a spectrum
auction. Sealed secondary price auction and VCG auction are
very preferable as they guarantee that bidders submit their
true evaluation values. As mentioned before, VCG auction
has many properties that are essential to have in a spec-
trum auction. However, VCG requires finding an optimal
allocation which is NP-complete because of the spectrum
spatial reusability property. In addition, VCG is vulnerable to
frauds of the auctioneer and bid-rigging between the insincere
auctioneer and greedy bidders [27]. Therefore, VCG auction
can not be used in a spectrum auction without countermeasures
for fraud and bid-rigging.
Bid-rigging between a greedy bidder and an auctioneer can
occur for the benefit of both. Since the auctioneer is aware
of all bidders’ bidding values, he can collude with a greedy
bidder and reveal the winning bid value to him. In Figure 5, we
show an example of a spectrum auction where the auctioneer
auctions one frequency band |M| = 1 to four BSs (i.e. subnet
2 of the frequency conflict graph that is shown in Figure 3).
The auctioneer runs a VCG auction that is equivalent to a
sealed secondary price auction for one frequency band auction.
In Figure 5(a), we show an example of bid-rigging. Bidder 4 is
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the winner and bidder 2 is a greedy bidder who colludes with
the auctioneer and learns about the highest bid. As a result,
bidder 2 bids a value that is higher than his true evaluation but
a little bit less than the highest bid. By doing so, the auctioneer
considers the bidding value of bidder 2 to be the charging price
for the winner (i.e. bidder 4). By such a bid-rigging action,
the auctioneer can make more profit and share the spoils with
bidder 2.
On the other hand, a fraud occurs when an insincere
auctioneer overcharges the winner in order to increase his own
profit. This results is an unexpected bad utility for the winner.
In Figure 5(b), bidder 4 is the winner and the charging price
should be 7 which is equivalent to the second highest bid.
However, the insincere auctioneer charges bidder 4 at 7.9 to
obtain higher revenue. This is possible since all bidding values
are sealed and bidders do not know about the bidding values
of each other.
To avoid possible bid-rigging and frauds, a successful spec-
trum auction design needs to take into consideration securing
the auction by making the auctioneer able to decide how to
allocate the frequency bands while keeping the bidders actual
bidding values unknown to the auctioneer. This is essential
to avoid possible back-room dealing and ensure a secure
spectrum auction.
(a) Bid-rigging between an insincere auctioneer and a greedy bidder
(b) Frauds of an insincere auctioneer
Fig. 5. Examples of bid-rigging and frauds in an unsecured spectrum auction
of one frequency band and four BSs.
IV. MTSSA: SECURE SPECTRUM AUCTION DESIGN
In order to enable an efficient usage of the under-utilized
shared spectrum managed by a broker. It is important to
design a secure spectrum auction that allows the broker to
provide a sufficient level of security, privacy and obfuscation
to enable a reliable and efficient usage of the shared spec-
trum. In order to thwart back-room dealing, it is essential
to have a mechanism that allows the auctioneer to find the
maximum bid among all bidders without knowing their actual
bids. The proposed MTSSA leverages Paillier cryptosystem
to avoid possible frauds and bid-rigging. In this section, we
first describe Paillier cryptosystem and point out its special
features. We then discuss MTSSA frequency bands allocation
procedure. Finally, we present the security part of MTSSA.
A. Paillier Cryptosystem
Some of Paillier cryptosystem properties are essential for
our secure spectrum auction design. Paillier cryptosystem
[27]–[29] is a probabilistic public key encryption system, i.e.
the term probabilistic encryption indicates that when encrypt-
ing the same plaintext for multiple times it yields different
ciphertexts, that satisfies special features such as homomorphic
addition, indistinguishability and self blinding.
The homomorphic properties of Paillier cryptosystem pro-
vide it with a notable feature. As the encryption function of a
message m, is given by C(m), is additively homomorphic. i.e.
C(m1 + m2) = C(m1)C(m2). On the other hand, with the
indistinguishability property of Paillier cryptosystem, if the
plaintext m is encrypted twice, the two created cyphertexts
are different from each other and no one can distinguish
the original plaintexts, except by random guessing, unless
decrypting the original ciphertexts. The self blinding property
allows changing the ciphertext publicly without affecting the
plaintext. Therefore, from the ciphertext C(m), it is possible
to compute a different randomized ciphertext C ′(m) without
knowing the decryption key or the original plaintext.
B. Frequency Bands Allocation Procedure
All BSs that are interested in the auction and belong to the
WSPs within the geographical region of the auction submit
their bidding values to participate in the auction. Based on
the location of these BSs and which WSPs they belong to,
the auctioneer creates an interference conflict graph (i.e. like
the one in Figure 3). The auctioneer executes the auction in
one subnet at a time. For each subnet, the auctioneer selects a
random BS n ∈ N to be the current root BS and considers its
corresponding subnet, i.e. connected nodes/BSs. After solving
for the current subnet, the auctioneer selects a new BS, that has
not been a root BS before, to be the new root BS and excludes
any previous root BS from its subnet along with the allocated
frequency bands to these BSs. Following the same procedure,
the auctioneer continues to execute the auction in one subnet
after another until each BS has participated in the auction.
Based on the subnet auction results, the auctioneer allocates
the corressonding root node the frequency bands and charges
it for the allocated resources. Each Bidder that is participating
in the auction maintains a local conflict-table, i.e. as in [13].
The bidder updates his bidding values if any BS within his
interference range (i.e. connected to him in the interference
conflict graph) wins frequency bands.
The MTSSA procedure is presented in the following steps:
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1. Each BS n ∈ N sets up its conflict-table and submits
its encrypted version of bidding values bn: Each WSP l
within the auctioneer’s geographical region creates a set of
all BSs N l that are interested in bidding for the auctioneer’s
under-utilized frequency bands. Each BS n ∈ N l creates a
conflict-table with all the interfering BSs denoted by In (i.e.
In is a set of all BSs that are located within the coverage area
of BS n). Each WSP l provides an update to each BS n ∈ N l
regarding its interfering BSs In1. Each n ∈ N l creates its
bidding vector bn that will be an input to a buffer that encrypts
the bidding values. The encrypted bids are then submitted to
federal gateway for randomization, see Section IV-C, then sent
to auctioneer, see Figure 4. Neither the auctioneer nor the
other bidders know the actual bidding values bn that BS n
has submitted. We show in Section IV-C1 the procedure of
encrypting the bidding values using Paillier encryption.
2. Start with a random BS n ∈ N and consider its
corresponding subnet: The auctioneer does not have an op-
timal choice regarding which subnet it starts the auction from
in order to maximize his revenue. Therefore, the auctioneer
selects a random bidder n from the set N and considers its
corresponding subnet (i.e. a subnet consists of a root BS n and
all other BSs connected to BS n in the interference conflict
graph except BSs that have been previously considered root
BSs).
3. The auctioneer carries out a secure spectrum auction
in the subnet of the selected BS n: The auctioneer performs
a secure spectrum auction procedure (detailed in Section IV-C)
in the current subnet under consideration.
4. Allocate frequency bands and charge price: Based on
the subnet auction’s results, the auctioneer allocates the root
BS frequency bands and charges it for the allocated resources.
The allocation and the payment vary based on the location of
root BS and its relative bid with respect to neighboring BSs.
Each winning BS stores its allocated frequency bands and its
charging price in the conflict-table.
5. Proceed to next root BS: A new root BS is selected
based on a random selection done by auctioneer and the
corresponding subnet secure bids are sent to auctioneer and
the process is repeated starting from step 2.
Algorithm IV.1 summarizes MTSSA spectrum auction pro-
cedure.
C. Secure Spectrum Auction Using Paillier Cryptosystem
In order for MTSSA to ensure a secure auction, it is im-
portant to design MTSSA such that no way for the auctioneer
to manipulate the auction. VCG auction is proven to have the
incentive compatibility property from the bidders side which
is essential for our design. In order for MTSSA to prevent the
auctioneer from conducting any frauds or bid-rigging [27], it
is important to limit the auctioneer’s capability by making him
only able to exploit the winners and their payments without
knowing the actual bidding values. So, by leveraging Paillier
1It is assumed that each WSP l is aware of all BSs in its coverage area
within the auction’s geographical region, whether they belong to it or to other
WSPs. Therefore, the set of interfering BSs In includes all BSs within the
coverage area of BS n that belong to WSP l as well as BSs that belong to
other WSPs.
Algorithm IV.1 MTSSA Frequency Bands Allocation
N = N 1 ∪N 2... ∪NL {i.e. N is the set of all BSs in the
interference conflict graph}
N0 = N
Auctioneer generates his private and public keys of Paillier
cryptosystem
Auctioneer sends public key and element x to all BSs via
pilot channel
while N ! = φ do
n = random(N ) {Auctioneer selects a random BS}
Nn = include conflict(n) {Auctioneer adds BSs that
form the nth subnet from conflict-table of nth BS as root}
N− = (N0 \ N ) ∩ Nn {N− is set of previous root BSs
in the nth subnet}
Nn = Nn \ N− {Auctioneer removes from Nn previous
root BSs}
M− = include alloc(N−) {M− is set of freq. bands
allocated to N−}
Mn = M \M− {Auctioneer removes from M freq.
bands allocated to N−}
Kn = alloc vect(Nn,Mn) {Auctioneer forms alloca-
tion vector Kn and sends to Nn}
BSs ∈ Nn send encrypted bids to federal gateway
Federal gateway randomizes bids and forward to auction-
eer
Auctioneer selects the highest allocation α⋆
Auctioneer charges price pn to BS n
N = N \ {n}
end while
cryptosystem in our design, MTSSA can ensure a secure
spectrum auction. Next we discuss in details how both the
bidders and the auctioneer need to collaborate in order to carry
out a secure spectrum auction.
1) Impact of Paillier Cryptosystem on the Bidding Values:
Encrypting the Bidding Values: Each bidder submits its
bidding values through a buffer that uses Paillier cyptosystem
to encrypt the bidding values and create a vector of ciphertexts
for each bidding value. Let s be a number that any actual
bidding value does not exceed and let z = b(α) be the actual
bidding value for allocation α such that 1 ≤ z ≤ s. Let the
vector of ciphertexts for z be c(z) that is given by
c(z) = (c1, ..., cs)
= (C(x), ..., C(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
, C(0), ..., C(0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
s−z
), (6)
where C(x) is the Paillier encryption of the public element
x (i.e. x 6= 0) and C(0) is the Paillier encryption of 0. As
mentioned before, C has a self blinding property which
makes z undeterminable without decrypting the elements in
c(z).
Selecting the Maximum Bidding Value: The auctioneer
can determine the bidder with the maximum bidding value
from the encrypted bidding values without knowing their
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actual values. Let c(zj) = (c1j , ..., csj) be the encrypted bidding
vector of bidder n for certain allocation α. First, consider the
product of all encrypted bidding vectors for allocation α,
∏
j
c(zj) = (Q1, ..., Qs) = (
∏
j
c1j , ...,
∏
j
csj). (7)
Due to the homomorphic addition property of Paillier cryp-
tosystem, Qi (i.e. 1 ≤ i ≤ s and i 6= j) is equivalent to
Qi =
∏
j
cij = C
γ(i)(x) = C(γ(i)x), (8)
where γ(i) represents the number of values that are equal
to or greater than i, i.e. γ(i) = |{j : zj ≥ i}|. Given that
γ(i) monotonically decreases when i increases, one way to
find the maximum of these bidding values is to decrypt Qi
and check whether the decrypted value C−1(Qi) equals 0 or
not for i changing from s → 1. Once the largest i with a
decrypted value C−1(Qi) 6= 0 is found, then the maximum
bidding value for the allocation α is determined to be i (i.e.
i = max{zj}).
Randomizing the Encrypted bidding Values: Without
knowing z, the federal gateway adds a constant t to the
encrypted vector c(z) and randomizes the rest of its elements.
This results in the following vector
c
′
(z + t) = (C(x), ..., C(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
, c
′
1, ..., c
′
s−z), (9)
where t can not be obtained from either c(z) or c′(z + t)
because of the self blinding property of Paillier cryptosystem.
In addition, t can not be figured out by comparing c(z) and
c(z + t) during the shifting and randomizing process.
2) Securing the MTSSA Subnet Auction: By using Paillier
cryptosystem as discussed in Section IV-C1, with encrypted
bidding values it is still possible to find the maximum bid
and the encrypted bidding vectors are randomized without
knowing their actual values. This makes it possible to apply a
VCG based auction in each subnet. As mentioned before, the
proposed MTSSA auction is carried out in one subnet after
another. In certain subnet, MTSSA auction is performed as
follows:
1. The auctioneer generates his private and public keys of
Paillier cryptosystem and publishes his public key and element
x over the pilot channel.
2. Each BS submits its sealed bidding vector bn = vn
(i.e. its true evaluation values since we consider a VCG based
auction). The auctioneer creates representing vectors CT =
C(O), C1 = C(O),...,CN = C(O) where N is the number
of bidders (i.e. BSs), the initial O(α) equals 0 and the size of
vector C equals |K|. In order for bidder z to keep his bidding
value bz secret, he adds his encrypted bidding value to all of
the representing vectors except Cz . Once all bidders are done
performing this addition, the auctioneer obtains
CT = (
∏
n
c(bn(α1)), ...,
∏
n
c(bn(α|K|))). (10)
Due to the homomorphic addition property of Paillier cryp-
tosystem, equation (10) is equivalent to
CT = (c(
∑
n
bn(α1)), ..., c(
∑
n
bn(α|K|))) = C(
∑
z
bz),
(11)
and
Cz = C(
∑
n6=z
bz) 1 ≤ z ≤ N. (12)
3. Federal gateway adds θ(α) = t to CT ,C1, ...,CN to
obtain C(
∑
n bn + θ) and C(
∑
n6=z bn+ θ)∀z. It sends these
randomized encrypted bids to auctioneer.
4. In order for the auctioneer to select an allocation for
the current subnet and find its corresponding charging price,
it finds the maximum sum value
g = argmax
α∈K
(
∑
n
bn(α) + θ(α))
= argmax
α∈K
(
∑
n
bn(α)) + t,
(13)
which can be determined by the auctioneer by taking the prod-
uct of all the encrypted elements in CT , i.e. as discussed in
Section IV-C1, which is equivalent to
∏|K|
i=1 c(
∑N
n=1 bn(αi)+
t). The auctioneer determines the maximum element in that
product which is equivalent to g in (13).
5. For each allocation α, the auctioneer decrypts the gth
element of vector c(
∑
n bn(α) + θ(α)) in CT and finds
whether it equals 0 or x. If it equals x at allocation α∗, then
the auctioneer selects α∗ to be the allocation that maximizes∑
n bn in the current subnet and considers its corresponding
BSs.
6. To find the charging price for the root BS, the auctioneer
decrypts c(
∑
n6=z bn(α
∗) + θ) of Cz and finds the masked
value (
∑
n6=z bn(α
∗) + θ).
7. The auctioneer then finds the maximum masked bid of the
product of the encrypted elements maxα∈K(
∑
n6=z bn(α)+ t),
similar to Step 4, which is equivalent to (
∑
n6=z bn(α
∗
−z)+ t).
8. The auctioneer then finds the charging price for root BS
of allocation α∗ that is given by
pz = (
∑
n6=z
bn(α
∗
−z) + t)− (
∑
n6=z
bn(α
∗) + t). (14)
V. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we first evaluate the performance of the
proposed MTSSA spectrum auction and compare it with the
performance of other spectrum auction mechanisms. Three
performance metrics are considered: spectrum utilization, auc-
tioneer’s revenue and bidders’ satisfaction. These are the most
important performance metrics that need to be maximized
in a successful spectrum auction. In addition, we analyze
the security strategy of the proposed secure spectrum auction
MTSSA that makes it able to avoid possible frauds and bid-
rigging.
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A. Performance Analysis
We consider a spectrum auction hosted by the auctioneer
(the broker) in a A ∗ A m2 square geographical region with
two cellular networks located within the same region where
the auction takes place. Each cellular network belongs to
different WSP, i.e. there exists two WSPs L = 2 that are
interested in participating in the spectrum auction. Each WSP
has certain number of BSs, located in macro cells or small
cells, that are interested in bidding for the auctioneer’s under-
utilized frequency bands. The BSs are randomly placed in
the auction’s geographical area. Suppose that the frequency
mutual interference between any two BSs is based on the
distance between them. Any two macro cells’ BSs located
within a distance of 0.4A can not be allocated the same
frequency bands and these BSs are connected together in
the frequency conflict graph. Also, any small cell’s BS can
not be allocated the same frequency bands of any other BS
located within a distance of 0.05A from it. In our simulation
setup, bids are selected randomly with biding per frequency
band is monotonically decreasing, i.e the BS’s bid for first
frequency band is higher than second frequency band and
second frequency band is higher than third frequency band
and so on, see [37]–[39].
Based on the frequency assignment policy, three spectrum
auction mechanisms are considered in our simulation as de-
scribed in the following three cases:
• Case 1 : Conventional spectrum leasing (CSL) case
where the government directly leases the under-utilized
spectrum to each WSP with heist bid. Once the WSP is
assigned certain frequency bands, it then allocates these
resources internally to its BSs.
• Case 2 : MTSSA where each WSP directly submits
all of its BSs’ encrypted bids to the auctioneer. The
auctioneer decides the frequency bands allocation to each
BS whereas the WSP has no control on the resources
allocation process. By using MTSSA frequency assign-
ment process, each BS can be allocated any number of
frequency bands between zero and all of the auctioneer’s
under-utilized frequency bands.
• Case 3 : MTSSA with fixed limit (MTSSA-FL) is a
special case of the proposed MTSSA where the frequency
bands allocation policy is similar to the proposed MTSSA
but is restricted in the number of frequency bands that
each BS can bid for. Each BS bids for a fixed number of
frequency bands and it can be allocated any number of
frequency bands between zero and that fixed number of
frequency bands it submitted the bids for.
We ran Monte Carlo Simulation, for the three cases de-
scribed above, and the results are averaged over 25 indepen-
dent runs in which the location and the bidding values of
the BSs are generated randomly and the performance metrics
are evaluated. We consider the network setup described above
with different number of macro cells and small cells’ BSs
that belong to the two WSPs. First, we consider 8 BSs, i.e. 4
macro cells’ BSs and 4 small cells’ BSs. Second, we consider
12 BSs, i.e. 6 macro cells’ BSs and 6 small cells’ BSs. Third,
we consider 16 BSs, i.e. 8 macro cells’ BSs and 8 small cells’
BSs.
We consider three performance metrics to compare between
CSL, MTSSA, and MTSSA-FL. These performance metrics
are:
• Spectrum Utilization: It is represented by the sum of the
frequency bands that are allocated by the auctioneer to
the winning BSs.
• Auctioneer’s Revenue: It is given by the sum of all BSs’
payments, i.e R =
∑n=N
n=1 pn.
• Bidders’ Satisfaction: It is represented by the sum of all
winning BSs’ utilities divided by the sum of all BSs’
evaluation values, i.e.
∑
n∈A Un/
∑
n∈N vn, where A is
the set of BSs that are allocated frequency bands.
In Figure 6, we compare the performance of the proposed
MTSSA and its special case MTSSA-FL with that of a CSL
based auction. We plot the spectrum utilization, auctioneers
revenue and BSs satisfaction of the three auction designs with
different number of BSs, i.e. 8 BSs, 12 BSs and 16 BSs as
mentioned before.
Figure 6(a) shows the spectrum utilization versus the num-
ber of available under-utilized frequency bands. As the number
of frequency bands increases, the spectrum utilization, which
is represented by the number of the allocated frequency bands,
also increases for each of the three auction mechanisms.
For certain number of frequency bands, each of the three
mechanisms shows higher utilization when the number of
BSs (bidders) increases. However, it is not surprising that the
performance in terms of utilization for CSL is lower than that
for the other two mechanisms. This is because in CSL, the
auctioneer assigns each WSP different frequency bands and
the frequency bands assigned to each WSP are then auctioned
among BSs that belong to that WSP. In the case of CSL,
the auctioneer considers one frequency conflict graph for each
WSP and frequency reusability is not applicable among BSs
that belong to different WSPs, i.e. BSs that belong to different
WSPs and are not within the interference range of each other
are not allowed to use the same frequency bands. Moreover,
the utilization in the cases of MTSSA and MTSSA-FL is
almost the same when the number of available frequency bands
is low and is slightly higher for MTSSA than that for MTSSA-
FL when the number of available frequency bands is higher.
Figure 6(b) shows that for each of the three mechanisms,
the auctioneer’s revenue increases when the number of BSs in-
creases. This is expected as the auctioneer’s revenue increases
with more bidders requesting more resources. However, for
certain number of BSs, the auctioneer’s revenue for MTSSA-
FL is higher than that for MTSSA and CSL and as expected
the auctioneer’s revenue is the lowest in the case of CSL. The
bump of MTSSA over CSL is from the payments received
from winning BSs that belong to different WSPs, and not
located within the interference range of each other, but are
allocated similar frequency bands.
We show in Figure 6(c) that as the number of frequency
bands increases, the bidders’ satisfaction also increases until
it saturates when each bidder is allocated the number of
frequency bands he bids for. On the other hand, the bidders
satisfaction for CSL is higher than that for MTSSA and
MTSSA-FL due to the less number of BSs competing for
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resources as all the frequency bands are allocated to one WSP.
Therefore, the bidders who belong to the winning WSP get
their requested frequency bands while paying less.
The comparison between the three mechanisms in Figure
6 shows that MTSSA behaves well in terms of performance
and proves to be better than the conventional spectrum leasing
mechanism as it considers spectrum reusability and in the same
time it guarantees a secure spectrum auction.
B. MTSSA Security Analysis
As discussed before, our proposed MTSSA leverages Pail-
lier cryptosystem in order to ensure that the BSs’ bidding
values are kept unknown to the auctioneer while the auc-
tioneer is still able to find the winners and charges them
their corresponding payments. This is possible because of the
indistinguishability property of Paillier cryptosystem, i.e. it is
not possible to know the value of z without decrypting each
element in c(z), and the self blinding property that makes it
impossible to find a mapping function from c(t) to c−1(z+ t)
[27]–[29]. In order to prevent an insincere auctioneer from
performing any frauds, we consider a secure gateway that
is operated by federal government. Its main function is to
randomize the encrypted bids by the random constant t. So
auctioneer can determine the winning allocation and assign
secondary price without any knowledge of the original bidding
values of BSs. This way MTSSA can avoid bid-rigging
between an insincere auctioneer and a greedy bidder. This
can be guaranteed because even if certain bidder colludes
with auctioneer, he can not find out about the bidding values
as federal gateway randomized it. Therefore, all BSs that
belong to different WSPs are treated equally by the proposed
MTSSA and their bidding values are kept secret from the
auctioneer who is only able to determine the winners and their
corresponding charged price.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a secure spectrum auction MTSSA
for a multi-tier dynamic spectrum sharing system. By consid-
ering the spectrum reusability property, MTSSA enables an
efficient sharing of the under-utilized frequency bands with
commercial WSPs. In order to allow spectrum reuse among
multiple WSPs, the frequency conflict graph that is considered
by MTSSA includes all BSs that belong to multiple WSPs
and the auction is carried out in one subnet after another.
MTSSA leverages Paillier cryptosystem and a federal gateway
to keep the BSs’ bidding values unknown to the auctioneer.
The auctioneer uses the additive homomorphic property of
Paillier cryptosystem to find the winning bidders and their
charging prices. This prevents possible frauds and bid-rigging
between an insincere auctioneer and greedy bidders. Compared
with conventional spectrum leasing mechanism, MTSSA has
shown better performance while providing a secure spectrum
auction against possible back room dealings.
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